|Benefit-Cost Summary Statistics Per Participant|
|Taxpayers||$57,627||Benefits minus costs||$353,828|
|Participants||$0||Benefit to cost ratio||$4.84|
|Others||$405,627||Chance the program will produce|
|Indirect||($17,274)||benefits greater than the costs||100 %|
|Net program cost||($92,152)|
|Benefits minus cost||$353,828|
|Detailed Monetary Benefit Estimates Per Participant|
|Benefits from changes to:1||Benefits to:|
|Adjustment for deadweight cost of program||$0||$0||$0||($46,126)||($46,126)|
|Detailed Annual Cost Estimates Per Participant|
|Annual cost||Year dollars||Summary|
|Program costs||$86,597||2011||Present value of net program costs (in 2016 dollars)||($92,152)|
|Comparison costs||$0||2011||Cost range (+ or -)||20 %|
|Estimated Cumulative Net Benefits Over Time (Non-Discounted Dollars)|
|The graph above illustrates the estimated cumulative net benefits per-participant for the first fifty years beyond the initial investment in the program. We present these cash flows in non-discounted dollars to simplify the “break-even” point from a budgeting perspective. If the dollars are negative (bars below $0 line), the cumulative benefits do not outweigh the cost of the program up to that point in time. The program breaks even when the dollars reach $0. At this point, the total benefits to participants, taxpayers, and others, are equal to the cost of the program. If the dollars are above $0, the benefits of the program exceed the initial investment.|
|Meta-Analysis of Program Effects|
|Outcomes measured||No. of effect sizes||Treatment N||Adjusted effect sizes (ES) and standard errors (SE) used in the benefit-cost analysis||Unadjusted effect size (random effects model)|
|First time ES is estimated||Second time ES is estimated|
|Crime elasticity: property||n/a||0||-0.763||0.116||30||-0.351||0.123||30||0.000||0.001|
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