ALL |
META-ANALYSIS |
CITATIONS |
|
Benefit-Cost Summary Statistics Per Participant | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Benefits to: | ||||||
Taxpayers | $720 | Benefits minus costs | $3,248 | |||
Participants | $1,697 | Benefit to cost ratio | $76.95 | |||
Others | $895 | Chance the program will produce | ||||
Indirect | ($21) | benefits greater than the costs | 87% | |||
Total benefits | $3,291 | |||||
Net program cost | ($43) | |||||
Benefits minus cost | $3,248 | |||||
Meta-Analysis of Program Effects | ||||||||||||
Outcomes measured | Treatment age | No. of effect sizes | Treatment N | Adjusted effect sizes(ES) and standard errors(SE) used in the benefit - cost analysis | Unadjusted effect size (random effects model) | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
First time ES is estimated | Second time ES is estimated | |||||||||||
ES | SE | Age | ES | SE | Age | ES | p-value | |||||
Test scores Standardized, validated tests of academic achievement. |
10 | 28 | 652322 | 0.019 | 0.011 | 12 | 0.015 | 0.013 | 17 | 0.019 | 0.095 |
Detailed Monetary Benefit Estimates Per Participant | ||||||
Affected outcome: | Resulting benefits:1 | Benefits accrue to: | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Taxpayers | Participants | Others2 | Indirect3 | Total |
||
Test scores | Labor market earnings associated with test scores | $720 | $1,697 | $895 | $0 | $3,312 |
Program cost | Adjustment for deadweight cost of program | $0 | $0 | $0 | ($21) | ($21) |
Totals | $720 | $1,697 | $895 | ($21) | $3,291 | |
Detailed Annual Cost Estimates Per Participant | ||||
Annual cost | Year dollars | Summary | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Program costs | $33 | 2010 | Present value of net program costs (in 2022 dollars) | ($43) |
Comparison costs | $0 | 2010 | Cost range (+ or -) | 20% |
Benefits Minus Costs |
Benefits by Perspective |
Taxpayer Benefits by Source of Value |
Benefits Minus Costs Over Time (Cumulative Discounted Dollars) |
The graph above illustrates the estimated cumulative net benefits per-participant for the first fifty years beyond the initial investment in the program. We present these cash flows in discounted dollars. If the dollars are negative (bars below $0 line), the cumulative benefits do not outweigh the cost of the program up to that point in time. The program breaks even when the dollars reach $0. At this point, the total benefits to participants, taxpayers, and others, are equal to the cost of the program. If the dollars are above $0, the benefits of the program exceed the initial investment. |
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