ALL |
META-ANALYSIS |
CITATIONS |
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Benefit-Cost Summary Statistics Per Participant | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Benefits to: | ||||||
Taxpayers | $4,606 | Benefits minus costs | $17,644 | |||
Participants | $0 | Benefit to cost ratio | n/a | |||
Others | $8,721 | Chance the program will produce | ||||
Indirect | $2,974 | benefits greater than the costs | 93% | |||
Total benefits | $16,302 | |||||
Net program cost | $1,343 | |||||
Benefits minus cost | $17,644 | |||||
Meta-Analysis of Program Effects | ||||||||||||
Outcomes measured | Treatment age | No. of effect sizes | Treatment N | Adjusted effect sizes(ES) and standard errors(SE) used in the benefit - cost analysis | Unadjusted effect size (random effects model) | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
First time ES is estimated | Second time ES is estimated | |||||||||||
ES | SE | Age | ES | SE | Age | ES | p-value | |||||
Crime Any criminal conviction according to court records, sometimes measured through charges, arrests, incarceration, or self-report. |
30 | 10 | 7036 | -0.164 | 0.125 | 32 | -0.164 | 0.125 | 42 | -0.351 | 0.130 |
Detailed Monetary Benefit Estimates Per Participant | ||||||
Affected outcome: | Resulting benefits:1 | Benefits accrue to: | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Taxpayers | Participants | Others2 | Indirect3 | Total |
||
Crime | Criminal justice system | $4,606 | $0 | $8,721 | $2,303 | $15,630 |
Program cost | Adjustment for deadweight cost of program | $0 | $0 | $0 | $671 | $671 |
Totals | $4,606 | $0 | $8,721 | $2,974 | $16,302 | |
Detailed Annual Cost Estimates Per Participant | ||||
Annual cost | Year dollars | Summary | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Program costs | $377 | 2009 | Present value of net program costs (in 2022 dollars) | $1,343 |
Comparison costs | $1,405 | 2009 | Cost range (+ or -) | 10% |
Benefits Minus Costs |
Benefits by Perspective |
Taxpayer Benefits by Source of Value |
Benefits Minus Costs Over Time (Cumulative Discounted Dollars) |
The graph above illustrates the estimated cumulative net benefits per-participant for the first fifty years beyond the initial investment in the program. We present these cash flows in discounted dollars. If the dollars are negative (bars below $0 line), the cumulative benefits do not outweigh the cost of the program up to that point in time. The program breaks even when the dollars reach $0. At this point, the total benefits to participants, taxpayers, and others, are equal to the cost of the program. If the dollars are above $0, the benefits of the program exceed the initial investment. |
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