|Benefit-Cost Summary Statistics Per Participant|
|Taxpayers||$4,122||Benefits minus costs||$15,784|
|Participants||$0||Benefit to cost ratio||n/a|
|Others||$7,801||Chance the program will produce|
|Indirect||$2,661||benefits greater than the costs||95 %|
|Net program cost||$1,200|
|Benefits minus cost||$15,784|
|Meta-Analysis of Program Effects|
|Outcomes measured||Treatment age||No. of effect sizes||Treatment N||Adjusted effect sizes(ES) and standard errors(SE) used in the benefit - cost analysis||Unadjusted effect size (random effects model)|
|First time ES is estimated||Second time ES is estimated|
Any criminal conviction according to court records, sometimes measured through charges, arrests, incarceration, or self-report.
|Detailed Monetary Benefit Estimates Per Participant|
|Affected outcome:||Resulting benefits:1||Benefits accrue to:|
|Crime||Criminal justice system||$4,122||$0||$7,801||$2,061||$13,983|
|Program cost||Adjustment for deadweight cost of program||$0||$0||$0||$600||$600|
|Detailed Annual Cost Estimates Per Participant|
|Annual cost||Year dollars||Summary|
|Program costs||$377||2009||Present value of net program costs (in 2018 dollars)||$1,200|
|Comparison costs||$1,405||2009||Cost range (+ or -)||10 %|
Benefits Minus Costs
Benefits by Perspective
Taxpayer Benefits by Source of Value
|Benefits Minus Costs Over Time (Cumulative Discounted Dollars)|
|The graph above illustrates the estimated cumulative net benefits per-participant for the first fifty years beyond the initial investment in the program. We present these cash flows in discounted dollars. If the dollars are negative (bars below $0 line), the cumulative benefits do not outweigh the cost of the program up to that point in time. The program breaks even when the dollars reach $0. At this point, the total benefits to participants, taxpayers, and others, are equal to the cost of the program. If the dollars are above $0, the benefits of the program exceed the initial investment.|
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